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Abstract. Among the various human factors impinging upon making a decision
in an uncertain environment, risk and trust are surely crucial ones. Several models
for trust have been proposed in the literature but few explicitly take risk into
account. This paper analyses the relationship between the two concepts by ﬁrst
looking at how a decision is made to enter into a transaction based on the risk
information. We then draw a model of the invested fraction of the capital function
of a decision surface. We ﬁnally deﬁne a model of trust composed of a reliability
trust as the probability of transaction success and a decision trust derived from
the decision surface.
1 Introduction
Manifestations of trust are easy to recognise because we experience and rely on it every
day. At the same time it is quite challenging to deﬁne the term because it is being used
with a variety of meanings and in many different contexts [12], what usually lead to
confusion. For the purpose of this study the following working deﬁnition inspired by
McKnight and Chervany’s work [12] will be used:
Deﬁnition 1 (Trust). Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to depend on
somebody, or something, in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even
though negative consequences are possible.
Although relatively general, this deﬁnition explicitly and implicitly includes the ba-
sic ingredients of trust. The term situation enables this deﬁnition to be adapted to most
needs, and thus be general enough to be used in uncertain and changing environments.
The deﬁnition acknowledges the subjective nature of trust by relying on one’s willing-
ness and relative security. The aspect of dependence is implicitly complemented by
uncertainty through possibility and by risk through negative consequences.
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Next Wave Technologies and Markets Programme.Risk emerges for example when the value at stake in a transaction is high, or when
this transaction has a critical role in the security or the safety of a system. It can be seen
as the anticipated hazard following from a fault in or an attack of the system and can be
measured by the consequences of this event.
The question regarding whether adequate models of risk and trust can be designed is
stillopenatthepresenttime.Thisensuesfromthefactthatthesetwonotionsencompass
so many aspects of our life that their understanding is made difﬁcult by the scale and
the subjectivity of the task. Furthermore, these notions intrinsically rely on uncertainty
and unpredictability, what complicates even more their modelling. Nevertheless, many
models and approaches have been proposed to delimit, to reason and to solve a part of
the problem that trust and risk constitute.
There are at the moment few trust systems and models that explicitly take the risk
factor into account [8]. In most trust systems considering risk, the user must explicitly
handle the relationship between risk and trust by combining the various ingredients
that the system provides. At the same time, all those systems acknowledge the intuitive
observationthatthetwonotionsareinaninverserelationship,i.e.lowvaluetransactions
are associated to high risk and low trust levels and vice versa, or, similarly, risk and trust
pull in opposite directions to determine a users acceptance of a partner [13].
Falcone and Castelfranchi (2001) [6] recognise that having high trust in a person is
not necessarily enough to decide to enter into a situation of dependence on that person.
In [6] they write: “For example it is possible that the value of the damage per se (in
case of failure) is too high to choose a given decision branch, and this independently
either from the probability of the failure (even if it is very low) or from the possible
payoff (even if it is very high). In other words, that danger might seem to the agent an
intolerable risk.”
Povey (1999) [14] introduces the concept of risk in McKnight and Chervany’s work.
Risk is exposed by the Trusting Behaviour and inﬂuences the Trusting Intentions and
possibly the Situational Decision to Trust. Dimitrakos (2002) [5] presents this schema
with a slightly different, and corrected, point of view. Trust metrics, costs and utility
functions are introduced as parameters of an algorithm that produces the trust policy for
a given trusting decision. Nevertheless, this work lacks a quantitative deﬁnition of the
various involved measures and lacks examples of application of this generic algorithm.
The SECURE project [4] analyses a notion of trust that is “inherently linked to
risk”. Risk is evaluated on every possible outcome of a particular action and is repre-
sented as a family of cost-PDFs (Probability Density Function) parameterized by the
outcome’s intrinsic cost. The considered action is then analysed by a trust engine to
compute multidimensional trust information which is then used by a risk engine to
select one cost-PDF. The decision to take the action is then made by applying a user-
deﬁned policy to select one of the possible outcomes’ cost-PDFs.
The system described by Manchala (1998) [10] avoids expressing measures of trust
directly, and instead develops a model based on trust-related variables such as the cost
of the transaction and its history, and deﬁnes risk-trust decision matrices as illustrated
in Figure 1. The risk-trust matrices are then used together with fuzzy logic inference
rules to determine whether or not to transact with a particular party.V V V V V
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Fig.1. Risk-trust matrix (from Manchala (1998) [10]).
In this paper, we expand on Manchala’s model of trust with the intention of reﬁn-
ing the relationship between trust and risk. Section 2 analyses how risk inﬂuences the
decision-making process by calculating some of the factors impinging upon the out-
come of the transaction. These factors are the expected gain and the fraction of the
capital that is invested. Section 3 follows by deriving two trust factors from the previ-
ous elements: reliability and decision trust. In Section 4, we conclude by summarising
our approach and discussing further work.
2 Decisions and Risk
Risk and trust are two tools for making decisions in an uncertain environment. Though
central to many works, these two indicators only have semantics in the context of a
decision that an agent is taking. An agent, here, can equivalently be a human being (e.g.
a stockbroker) or a program (e.g. a software agent), whose owner (another agent) has
delegated the decision-making process for a particular kind of interaction.
We focus on transactions rather than general interactions. This abstraction is not
a limitation but rather a point of view on interactions, since most interactions can be
modelled by transactions. Collaborations can be viewed as a group of transactions, one
for each collaborator. The case of an attack by a malicious agent is a degenerated case
where the transaction is abused by the attacker who invests fake income. Lastly, de-
pendability can be considered as a combination of the various transactions between the
agents so that the transactions’ history and their overall effect are summarized.
Since risk is involved, we assume that numerical information is available from the
transaction context to compute the level of risk. Practically these values may be hard
to determine, since many factors of the transaction need to be taken into account [7,1],
and ﬁnancial modelling may not be suited to all the transaction contexts. For the sake of
simplicity, we will limit ourselves to simple ﬁnancial transaction contexts, but without
loss of generality in our explorative approach.In classical gambling theory the expected monetary value EV of a gamble with n
mutually exclusive and exhaustive possible outcomes can be expressed as:
EV = I
n  
i=1
piGi (1)
where pi is the probability of outcome i and Gi is the gain factor on the monetary
investment (or bet) I in case of outcome i.
However in many cases the utility is not the same as monetary value, and expected
utility EU is introduced to express the personal preferences of the agent. In classical
utility theory the expected utility can be expressed as a linear function of the probabili-
ties:
EU =
n  
i=1
piu(IGi) (2)
where u is an a priori non-linear function of monetary value. In traditional EU
theory the shape of the utility function determines risk attitudes. For example, the agent
would be risk averse if u is a concave function, meaning that, at a particular moment,
utility gain from a certain transaction outcome is less that the actual monetary value
of the same outcome. Considering that a utility function is identiﬁed only up to two
constants (origin and units) [11], the concavity condition can be simpliﬁed to: u(IG) <
IGfor risk aversion behaviour; and u(IG) >IGfor risk seeking behaviour.
However, studies (e.g. [2]) show that people tend to be risk seeking for small values
of p, except if they face suffering large losses in which case they will be risk averse (e.g.
buy insurance). On the contrary, people accept risk for moderate to large values of p or
to avoid certain or highly probable losses. The later case can be illustrated by a situation
of trust under pressure or necessity: if the agent ﬁnds himself in an environment where
he faces an immediate high danger (e.g. a ﬁre) and has to quickly decide whether or not
to use an insecure means (e.g. a damaged rope) to get out of this environment, he will
chose to take this risk, thus implicitly trusting the insecure means, since it is a better
alternative than death.
These studies show that risk attitudes are not determined by the utility function
alone. We will not attempt to formally describe and model risk attitudes. Instead we
will simply assume that risk attitudes are individual and context dependent, and based
on this attempt to describe some elements of the relationship between trust and risk
attitudes. For an overview of alternative approaches to utility theory see Luce (2000)
[9] for example.
When analysing the relationship between risk and trust, we will limit ourselves
to the case of transactions with two possible outcomes, by associating a gain factor
Gs ∈ [0,∞] to the outcome of a successful transaction and a loss factor Gf ∈ [−1,0]
to the outcome of a failed transaction. This can be interpreted as saying that a gain
on an investment can be arbitrarily large and that the loss can be at most equal to the
investment.
A purely rational and risk-neutral (in the sense that it has no particular propensity to
take or avoid risks) agent will decide to enter into a transaction as long as the expectedutility is positive. Since risk-neutrality means that u(IG)=IG, we use an expression
for expected gain without a factor I to determine whether the expected utility will be
positive or negative. Given an investment I the return will be IGs in the case of a
successful transaction, and the loss will be IGf in case the transaction fails.If we denote
by p the probability of success, the expected gain EGcan then be expressed as:
EG = pGs +( 1− p)Gf
= p(Gs − Gf)+Gf
(3)
The expected value, which is the same as the expected utility in the case of a risk-
neutral attitude, resulting from an investment I can in turn be expressed as:
EV = EU = I · EG (4)
The parameters Gs, Gf and p determine whether the expected gain is positive or
negative. If we assume that a transaction failure causes the total investment to be lost,
which can be expressed by setting Gf = −1, the expected gain EGis equal to p(Gs +
1) − 1, as illustrated in Figure 2.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 Transaction gain Gs
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Probability p -1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Expected gain EG
Fig.2. Expected gain as a function of transaction gain and probability of success.
In Figure 2, the sloping surface (squared and solid line) represents the expected
gain for given values of Gs and p, whereas the horizontal surface (squared and dotted
line) represents the cut-off surface for zero expected gain. The intersection between
the two surfaces is marked with a bold line. Points on the sloping surface above thisline represent positive expected gain, whereas points below the line represent negative
expected gain.
Figure 2 covers expected gains in the range [−1,3] (-100% + 300%) but in general
the expected gain can be from −1 to any positive value depending on Gs. For exam-
ple, public lottery can provide gains Gs in the order of several millions although the
probability of success is so low that the expected gain is usually negative. An expected
gain EG = −1 occurs for example when lending money to a con-artist (p =0and
Gf = −1).
However, it is not enough to consider whether a transaction has a positive expected
gain when making a decision to transact. How much the relying party can afford to
loose also plays a role. We examine two examples in order to illustrate this behaviour.
In the ﬁrst example, an agent deposits amount C in a bank. The transaction consists
of keeping the money in the bank for one year in order to earn some interests. The
transaction gain Gs is simply the bank’s interest rate on savings. The probability of
success p is the probability that the money will be secure in the bank. Although money
kept in a bank is usually very secure, p can never realistically be equal to 1, so there
is a remote possibility that C might be lost. Given that the transaction gain for bank
deposits are relatively low, the decision of the relying party to keep his money in the
bank can be explained by the perception that there is no safer option easily available.
As another example, let the transaction be to buy a $1 ticket in a lottery where
there are 1,000,000 tickets issued and the price to be won is valued at $900,000. In
this case, according to Equation 3 Gs = 900,000, Gf = −1 and p = 1
1,000,000,s o
that EG = −$0.10. The fact that people still buy lottery tickets can be explained by
allocating a value to the thrill of participating in the hope to win the price. By assuming
the utility of the thrill to be valued at $0.11, the expected gain becomes $0.01, or close
to neutral gain. Buying two tickets would not double the thrill and therefore puts the
expected gain in negative.
These examples, as well as the case of trust under pressure or necessity previously
illustrated, show that people are willing to put different amounts of money at risk de-
pending on the transaction gain and the probability of success. A purely rational agent
(in the classic sense) would be willing to invest in any transaction as long as the ex-
pected gain is positive. Real people on the other hand will in general not invest all their
capital even though the expected gain is positive. More precisely, the higher the proba-
bility of success, the higher the fraction of the total capital an agent is willing to put at
risk. Let C represent an agent’s total capital and FC ∈ [0,1] represent the fraction of
capital C it is willing to invest in a given transaction. The actual amount I that a person
is willing to invest is determined as I = FCC. In the following analysis, we use FC
rather than I because it abstracts the capital value, by normalising the variable that we
are studying.
In general FC varies in the same direction as Gs when p is ﬁxed, and similarly FC
varies like p when Gs ﬁxed. As an example to illustrate this general behaviour let a
given agent’s risk attitude be determined by the function:
FC(p,Gs)=p
λ
Gs (5)where λ ∈ [1,∞] is a factor moderating the inﬂuence of the transaction gain Gs on
the fraction of total capital that the relying party is willing to put at risk. We will use
the term decision surface to describe the type of surface illustrated in Figure 3.
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Fig.3. Example of an agent’s risk attitude expressed as a decision surface.
λ isinterpreted as a factorof therelying party’sriskaversion inthe given transaction
context, and in Fig.3 λ = 10000. . Independently from the utility function (propensity
towards risk), λ represents the contextual component of the risk attitude. A low λ value
is representative of a risk-taking behaviour because it increases the volume under the
surface delimited by FC (pushes the decision surface up in Figure 3), whereas a high λ
value represents risk aversion because it reduces the volume under the surface (pushes
the decision surface down).
Risk attitudes are relative to each individual, so the shape of the surface in Figure 3
only represents an example and will differ for each agent. In this example, we assumed
a relatively complex function to represent a non-linear investment behaviour. We do
not address here the issue of user modelling, but simply choose a non-trivial example.
The surface shape depends as much on the personal preferences of the agent as on its
mood in the particular context, but this does not preclude that in unusual situations
agent may behave out of the norm, even irrationally. The risk attitude also depends on
the total capital C an agent possesses and can change as a function of past experience,
notably via the agent’s conﬁdence. As already mentioned, we will not try to deﬁnegeneral expressions for individual risk attitudes. The expression of Equation 5, with the
corresponding surface in Figure 3, only illustrates an example.
A particular transaction will be represented by a point in the 3D space of Figure 3
with coordinates (Gs, p, FC). Because the surface represents an agent’s risk attitude the
agent will per deﬁnition accept a transaction for which the point is located underneath
the decision surface, and will reject a transaction for which the point is located above
the decision surface.
3 Balancing Trust and Risk
We now move our point of view on the situation from risk to trust. Whereas in Section 2
the situation was modelled as a transaction, here it revolves around the concepts of de-
pendence and uncertainty. By this we mean that the outcome of the transaction depends
on somebody or something and that the relying party is uncertain about the outcome of
the transaction.
Weassumethattransactionscaneitherbesuccessfulorfailuresandthattheoutcome
of a transaction depends on a party x. Furthermore we will let the uncertainty about the
outcome of the transaction be represented by the probability p used in Section 2. We can
deduce from these hypotheses that p in fact represents the reliability of x for producing
a successful outcome, and that p thereby partly represents the trustworthiness of x.
Deﬁnition 2 (ReliabilityTrust).Reliabilitytrustisdeﬁnedasthetrustingparty’sprob-
ability estimate p of success of the transaction.
As shown in Section 2, the speciﬁc value of p that will make the relying party enter
into a transaction also depends on the transaction gain Gs and the invested fraction of
the capital FC
The idea is that, for all combination of values of Gs, p and FC underneath the de-
cision surface in Figure 3, the relying party trusts x, whereas values above the decision
surface lead the relying party to distrust x for this particular transaction. The degree to
which the relying party trusts x depends on the distance from the current situation to
the decision surface. For example, in the case where Gs is close to zero and FC is close
to one, the relying party will normally not trust x even if p (i.e. the reliability trust) is
high.
Since in reality p represents a relative measure of trust and that even agents with
high p values can be distrusted, the question is whether it would be useful to deter-
mine a better measure of trust, i.e. one that actually measures whether x is trusted for a
particular transaction in a given context. Such a measure must necessarily be more com-
plex because of its dependence on gains, investment values and possibly other context-
dependent parameters. Although it strictly speaking constitutes an abuse of language to
interpret p as a measure of trust, it is commonly being done in the literature. We will
therefore not dismiss this interpretation of p as trust, but rather explicitly use the term
reliability trust to describe it.
Another question which arises when interpreting p as trust is whether it would be
better to simply use the concepts of reliability or outcome probability for modelling
choice because trust does not add any new information. In fact it has been claimed thatthe concept of trust is void of semantic meaning in economic theory [17]. We believe
that this is an exaggeration and that the notion of trust carries important semantics. The
concept of trust is particularly useful in a context of relative uncertainty where a relying
party depends on another party to avoid harm and to achieve a successful outcome.
As an attempt to deﬁne a measure that adequately represents trusting decisions,
we propose to use the normalized difference between x’s reliability p and the cut-off
probability on an agent’s decision surface, what we will call decision trust.
Deﬁnition 3 (Decision Trust). Let us assume that: 1) the relying party’s risk attitude
is deﬁned by a speciﬁc decision surface D; 2) a transaction X with party x is char-
acterised by the probability p of x producing a successful outcome, by the transaction
gain Gs, and by the fraction of the relying party’s capital FC to be invested in the trans-
action; 3) pD is the cut-off probability on the decision surface D for the same values of
Gs and FC. The decision trust T, where T ∈ [−1,1], is then deﬁned as:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
For p<p D : T =
p−pD
pD
For p = pD : T =0
For p>p D : T =
p−pD
1−pD
(6)
This decision trust is ﬁrst deﬁned by its three extreme points: (0,−1), (pD,0), and
(1,1). The next constraint is that the decision trust must explicitly depend on a distance
between the current probability p and the cut-off probability pD. We then choose the
most simple functions, given that we have no a priori knowledge or experimental data,
i.e. a linear function from the distance δ = p − pD.
A positive decision trust is interpreted as saying that the relying party trusts x for
this transaction in this context. A zero decision trust is interpreted as saying that the
relying party is undecided as to whether he or she trusts x for this transaction because
x’s reliability trust is at the cut-off value on the decision surface. Finally, a negative
decision trust corresponds to the relying party not trusting x for the transaction in this
context.
As an example, Figure 4 illustrates the case of two possible transactions X1 and
X2. This ﬁgure is a section of the decision surface D in Figure 3 for a given value of
Gs. The probability difference δ is illustrated for the two transactions X1 and X2,a s
δ1 and δ2 respectively. The ﬁgure illustrates the case of positive (T1) and negative (T2)
decision trust, although the actual transaction probability p (i.e. reliability trust) is the
same for both situations.
Finally, one can ask what the relying party should do in the case when the decision
trust is negative. Povey (1999) [14] argues that, if the trusting decision is not made, the
relying party can treat the risk by: 1) adding countermeasures; 2) deferring risk; 3) or
re-computing trust with more or better metrics. Options 1 and 2 aim at increasing the
reliability trust p by, respectively, increasing the cost I for the transacting opponent, and
hoping that time will soften the relying party’s investment. Option 3 conﬁrms our idea
that complex trust measures which are introduced early may sap an interaction. The two
interacting parties would then need to re-negotiate the terms of the interaction.0
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Fig.4. Illustrating decision trust by difference between reliability and decision cut-off probability.
Traditional risk management [15,3] provides us with even more solutions, like risk
diversiﬁcation or risk control, but that falls outside the subject of this study.
4 Conclusion
Risk and trust are two facets of decision-making through which we view the world and
choose to act. In an attempt to shape the relationship between risk and trust, this paper
tries to reﬁne Manchala’s model in order to derive a computational model integrating
the two notions. We ﬁrst compute the transaction’s expected gain and illustrate it on
several examples. But this transaction factor is not enough to determine the choice of
whether to transact or not. We complete this model by introducing the fraction of the
capital that an agent is willing to risk.
The intuitive parallel with trust of the ﬁrst part of our approach is to use the proba-
bility of success of the transaction as a measure of trust, what we called reliability trust.
The decision surface which deﬁnes an agent’s risk attitude is then taken into account
in order to derive a more complete deﬁnition of trust, the decision trust. This approach
provides a more meaningful notion of trust because it combines trust with risk attitudes.
This work is a ﬁrst step at integrating the two important aspects of decision-making
that are risk and trust. We explored their relationship by trying to deﬁne a model that
could be applied to various examples. Although there is no universal mathematical
deﬁnition of several aspects of our model (utility function, decision surface) [16], we
showed how agent’s risk attitudes can be modelled and evaluated in the case of a par-
ticular transaction.As further work, the model needs to be tested with various utility function shapes
and decision surfaces, and extended to cope with multiple outcomes. Several other vari-
ables can also be integrated into this model. First, we could incorporate more economics
and legal information. For example, insurances would consider contractual transactions
or the inﬂuence of the law, and they could take the form of basic outcomes, minimal
investments and speciﬁc risk thresholds. Secondly, the temporal aspects should be ex-
plored, for example via reinforcement learning or planning techniques to model how
an agent adapts to a sequence of transactions. This research activity should tie together
trust and risk dynamics. As a continuation of this work, research will be conducted to
analyse the situation where trust decision is not made after risk evaluation.
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